An Organizational-Economic Blueprint for Information Technology Outsourcing: Concepts and Evidence by Loh, Lawrence
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
ICIS 1994 Proceedings International Conference on Information Systems(ICIS)
12-31-1994
An Organizational-Economic Blueprint for
Information Technology Outsourcing: Concepts
and Evidence
Lawrence Loh
National University of Singapore
Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis1994
This material is brought to you by the International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted
for inclusion in ICIS 1994 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Loh, Lawrence, "An Organizational-Economic Blueprint for Information Technology Outsourcing: Concepts and Evidence" (1994).
ICIS 1994 Proceedings. 8.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis1994/8




Faculty of Business Administration
National University of Singapore
ABSTRACT
The emergence of information technology (IT) as a critical determinant for business productivity brings a
fundamental need to align the IT strategy with the corporate suatgy. A basic issue arising from this
imperative is the choice of effective structural mechanisms to govern the IT function. Our paper
constructs and tests an integrated governance model of IT outsourcing at both the firm and the dyadic
levels. It extends the traditional boundary of organizational economics to develop emerging domains such
as bargaining costs, influence costs, management costs, and decision information costs. Within a context
of IT outsourcing, key constructs and corresponding measures inherent in each cost domain are developed
and tested. The data are drawn from surveys involving a large sample of 463 senior IT managers across
209 leading corporations in the U.S.
1. INTRODUCTION mally leveraged for its advantages. On a analogous note,
this is equivalent to the familiar "make-versus-buy" option
As infortnation technology (IT) embraces a broader role in facing any business.
the corporation and in interorganizational relationships
between firms, the productivity impact of the ]T function is Within a broader context, the importance of governance in
a key factor for business success in the competitive market- the IT setting corresponds with the increasing attention to
place (Henderson and Venkatraman 1993). Disappointing- mechanisms for corporate governance among strategy and
ly, the majority of empirical evidence has pointed to the organization researchers (Donaldson 1990). Viewed as
negligible, if not negative, role IT has played in enhancing institutional structures that serve to influence the exchange
business productivity (Brynjolfsson 1992). Nevertheless, process, these mechanisms include external arrangements
the effective governance of IT, particularly through such as long-term contracts, licensing agreements, and
sourcing choices, has been deemed to be instrumental in partnerships as well as internal arrangements such as
deriving maximal benefits and value for the business (Huff executive compensation and board composition (Hesterly,
1991; Loh 1993). Liebeskind, and Zenger 1990).
Strategically, having the best IT resources that can deliver This paper extends the research agenda on governance
the requisite competencies for the firm is a challenge mechanisms for the IT context Specifically, it constructs
confronting many firms (Huber 1993; Lacity and Hirsch- an integrated framework for IT governance using a set of
heim 1993). A central issue facing top management in variance-theoretic (Mohr 1982) determinants involving both
acquiring these IT-based capabilities is whether it makes an exchange level (i.e., a dyadic level between the user and
good business sense to maintain its IT organization inter- the vendor) and an organizational level (i.e., a firm level of
nally or lo outsource all or parts of it (Loh and Venkatra- the user). Traditionally, the anchors in analyzing gover-
man 1992a, 1992b). Essentially, IT outsourcing is the nance choices are based on transaction cost economics
allocation of decision rights or responsibilities of all or (Williamson 1975, 1985) and, to some extent, agency
parts of a corporation's IT infrastructure toward an external theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Beyond these tradi-
vendor. In other words, the sourcing question is basically tional theories, the paper proposes and tests constructs
the choice of the most appropriate structural mechanism for based on other new yet critical components of organization-
managing IT vis-a-vis a vendor such that IT can be maxi- al economics such as bargaining costs (Milgrom and
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Roberts 1990), decision information costs (Gurbaxani and staff are trained to operate only customized applications or
Whang 1991), influence costs (Milgrom and Roberts 1988), routines that are distinctive to a given vendor or platform.
and management costs (Demsetz 1988). In testing the
model, our data were generated from key managers from Hypothesis 1: Asset specificity inherent in the
three IT functional domains - application development structuring of a user-vendor relationship is posi-
data center management, telecommunications/network tively related with dyadic costs that are associated
management - pooled across 209 Fortune 500 corporations with IT outsourcing.
based in the U.S.
Uncertainty is another facet of transaction costs pervading a
governance relationship between transacting parties. An
2. AN ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMIC exchange environment characterized by such uncertainty is
DECOMPOSITION OF GOVERNANCE a breeding ground for opportunism, especially when ration-
COSTS ality of the agents is severely limited. Governance struc-
tures differ in their abilities to cope with the effects of
We define the entire spectrum of costs relevant to the uncertainty. Internalizing a transaction through the hierar-
exchange as governance costs. These costs can be catego- chical mode of organization results in an authority-based
rized into firm costs and dyadic costs. Our framework is relationship that can mitigate the costs of uncertainty. In
depicted in Figure 1. It broadens the existing integrative an IT governance setting, technological uncertainty span-
cost research in Gurbaxani and Whang as well as in Sund- ning a potential user-vendor relationship may include
aram and Venkatraman (1992). adoption of standards, introduction of new functionalities,
and obsolescence of hardware and software. Uncertainty is
also present in the measurement of cost-performance trends,
2.1 Dyadic Costs and IT Governance productivity of IS staff, and quality of outputs associated
with a vendor.
Dyadic costs are those costs that arise from the level of the
exchange between the buyer and the seller of an economic Hypothesis 2: Uncertainty inherent in Lhe struc-
good. In the development of our conceptual perspectives, turing of a user-vendor relationship is positively
we propose hypotheses pertaining to dyadic costs within the related with dyadic costs that are associated with
specific context of IT governance. IT outsourcing.
Transaction Costs. Along a broad view, transaction costs Bargaining Costs. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) extend
refer to the costs connected to the exchange of goods or transaction cost theory by proposing a bargaining cost
services across the boundary of the firm (Coase 1937). framework of contractual exchange. Accordingly, the
Generally, these costs arise from negotiation, monitoring, choice between a market mechanism and a fonnal orgax,iza-
and enforcement in the contract between the participants of tion rests crucially on the costs of bargaining over short-
the relationship. Accordingly, the firm exists as a direct tenn ·arrangements between independent economic agents.
consequence of market failure, more specifically, in in- Milgrom and Roberts (1990, p. 65) define bargaining costs
stances where the transaction costs associated with the as "all the costs associated with multilateral bargaining,
market alternative are too high. The transaction thus competitive bidding, and other voluntary mechanisms for
constitutes the fundamental unit of organizational analysis determining a mutually acceptable agreement" Essentially,
and the focus of the transaction cost paradigm is the selec- bargaining costs arise when the market mechanism fails
tion of the most efficient governance mechanism. In line even though transaction costs arising from the fundamental
with Williamson (1985), we identify asset specificity and attributes (e.g., asset specificity and uncertainty) are nonex-
uncertainty as the two more important constructs of these istent. For instance, within the famous "prisoners' dilem-
costs for the context of IT governance. ma" in noncooperative game theory, even when there are
no transaction costs, it is dimcult for a mutual agreement to
Asset specificity is the consequence of the small-numbers be realized.
scenario in the original transaction cost framework CNil-
liamson 1975). It refers to the unique or idiosyncratic A major component of bargaining costs is related to goal
investments that are sunk by a party of an economic ex- alignment between contracting parties. When the goals of
change to facilitate the transaction. In our specific context the contracting parties do not converge, there will be
of IT governance, this specificity arises when firms have difficulties in the realization of an agreement. In the
their hardware, software, and communications architectures context of IT governance, a market mode is appropriate,
or platforms uniquely developed for customized usages. for instance, if mutual trust can be promoted or if a shared
Further, this specificity is inherent, for instance, when IS vision can be cultivated.
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Hypothesis 3: Goal alignment inherent in the Hypothesis 5: Monitoring inherent in tile struc-
structuring of a user-vendor relationship is nega- turing of a user-vendor relationship is negatively
tively related with dyadic costs that are associated related with dyadic costs that are associated with
with IT outsourcing. IT outsourcing.
Another basic concept in bargaining cost theory is the Another key element underlying any contract between a
difficulties involved in the settlement of differences during principal and an agent is the incentive payment scheme.
the contract negotiation process. These impediments to To reduce the conflict of interest inherent in this dyadic
contractual formation are the outcomes of instances where relationship, part or all of the agent's compensation can be
individuals could adopt different patterns of mutually made contingent on the realized outcome of the delegated
consistent, self-interested behavior and where market work (Grossman and Hart 1983). This control mechanism
institutions fail to ensure that only efficient patterns is termed as outcome-based contracting (Eisenhardt 1989).
emerge. The importance of contractual resolution is under- One of the major factors affecting the mode of IT gover-
scored by the wide range of contingencies that needs to be nance is the ability to structure a payment system based on
addressed before an IT-based agreement can be finalized actual service level provided. In addition, IT governance is
(see Brandon and Halvey 1990). Thus, in the specific case influenced by the contractual feasibility in implementing
of IT governance, the need for contractual resolution may contingent penalties or damages for nonperformance or an
stem from the negotiation of contractual terms such as incentive bonus based on actual overall user's business
those that relate to staff employment, dispute settlement, performance.
and renewal or termination option.
Hypothesis 6: Incentive payoff inherent in tile
structuring of a user-vendor relationship is nega-Hypothesis 4: Contractual resolution inherent in
tively related with dyadic costs that are associatedthe structuring of a user-vendor relationship is
with IT outsourcing.negatively related with dyadic costs that are asso-
ciated with IT outsourcing.
Influence Costs. The theory of influence activities has
Agency Costs. Agency theory considers an organization as
recently been advanced as critical explanations of the
a nexus of treaties among individuals (Jensen and Meckling
inefficiencies associated with organizational modes (Mil-
1976). The theory thus considers the contractual context of
grom 1988; Milgrom and Roberts 1988, 1990). Such costs
a principal and an agent. The two basic problems asso- arise because "participants inevitably care about the deci-
ciated with a contract between economic parties are moral sions that the central authority can make and so tend to
hazard and adverse selection. The first refers to the lack of spend too much time trying to influence the authority's
effort by the agent to maximize the welfare of the principal
decisions" (Milgrom 1988, p. 43). In other words, these
(e.g., through shirking or perk consumption). The second are the consequences when organizations expend resources
to mitigate the suboptimal redistribution and reduction ofrefers to the false declaration of ability by the agent to the firm value, rather than its creation. In a sense, influenceprincipal (e.g., through misrepresentation of productivity). costs are synonymous to what Williamson (1985) refers to
as "costs of bureaucracy" that result when successiveAgency costs can be relevant in both the firm and the production stages are joined,dyadic contexts. In the firm context, these costs have been
argued to be of limited use in the determination of alterna- In the IT outsourcing industry, there is a variety of tech-
tive governance mechanisms (Sundaram and Venkattaman niques vendors can employ to induce a contractual agree-
1992). In the dyadic context, the problem is a consequence ment. For instance, vendors can restrict a buyer's discretion
of conflict of interests inherent in a buyer-seller relation- from whom to make the purchase through a "lock-in" of
ship; this is more crucial for the governance choice setting. users. Vendors can also use exchange facilitation to innu-
ence a prospective buyer such as through efforts that are
In the presence of divergent interests within an economic over and above what is necessary for the completion of the
exchange, the principal can ensure the convergence of the transaction. For example, vendors may resort to marketing
welfare of both parties through mechanisms that provide activities that are not value-adding or may cultivate per-
information on the agent's efforts (Holmstrom 1979). The sonal relationships with the key decision-makers of user
mode of exchange that allows verifiability of the agent's organizations.
actions is termed as behavior-based contracting (Eisenhardt
1989). In the specific case of IT governance, critical Hypothesis 7: Agreement inducement inherent in
assessment criteria may include operating performance the structuring of a user-vendor relationship is
(e.g., completion time), investments in technological inno- positively related with dyadic costs that are associ-
vation, and staff development ated with lT outsourcing.
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In summary, we have specified seven components of dyadic tracted from their fundamental business strategic thrusts in
costs in the context of IT governance based on tile indivi- the marketplace by the ongoing problems related to the
dual cost domains in organizational economics. In essence, operation of the IT function. IT is considered to be a core
this implies that dyadic costs derive the theoretical mean- competence if it is central to the basic business and a key
ingfulness from the specific constructs. Synthesizing the strategy of the firm. To the extent that a firm needs to
above discussion, we propose: specialize in strategic IT competence as opposed to opera-
tional IT activities, in terms of firm costs, it is more effi-
Hypothesis 8: Dyadic costs inherent in the struc- cient to contract out a part or the whole of its IT infrastruc-
turing of a user-vendor relationship are negatively ture to vendors.
related with an outsourcing mode of IT gover-
ijance. Hypothesis 9: The strategic disposition of IT is
negatively related with firm costs that are asso-
ciated with IT outsourcing.
2.22 Firm Costs and IT Governance
Another aspect of management costs in relation to lhe
Firm costs emanate from the level of the internal organiza- imperative for knowledge specialization pertains to technol-
tion in the provision of the economic activity. As in the ogy. Taking a broad view of "technology as knowledge"
case of dyadic costs, we advance the components of firm (Deiaco, Hornell, and Vickery 1990), we emphasize the
costs wilh key underlying constructs for the IT governance intangible assets and capabilities embodied in the firm's
context. ability to appropriate and benefit from the creation, dissem-
ination, and utilization of know-how; here, technology is
Management Costs. Demsetz proposes the notion of construed as human knowledge applied in production.
management costs that characterized "firm-like organiza- Accordingly, firms need to specialize in order to miligate
tion." These costs are defined as those of organizing re- expenditures in maintaining and communicating technologi-
sources within firms. Specifically, a finn is fr=ed within cal knowledge within the organization.
a traditional contractual perspective in three ways. First,
the corporate charter is an implicit agreement for the firm Because technology, particularly IT, is a complex and
to specialize. Second. the firm constitutes an agreement dynamic corporate resource, firms are often limited in their
among tile input owners to coiltinue their association on a abilities to be on the leading edge of the technology frontier
long-term basis. Third, team production as in a firm (Quinn 1992). Further, it is costly and inefficient for firms
implies that the input owners agree to rely on a certain that are undeveloped in their IT capability to be innovative
degree of conscious direction for guiding the usage of in their implementation of the technology. In sum, the
resources. acquisition of computing technologies and technical exper-
tise from external sources is a means in response to this
Demsetz further argues that management costs are linked to technological imperative.
the costly production, maintenance, and usage of knowledge
in firms. Specialization enables firms to economize on Hypothesis 10: The technological imperative to
such knowledge activities. The vertical boundaries of a specialize is positively related with firm costs that
firm are thus determined by the economies of conservation are associated with IT outsourcing.
of expenditures on this knowledge.
Decision Information Costs. Gurbaxani and Whang
In the context of IT governance, a widely-held belief within formulate the concept of decision informatiOn costs to
the practicing profession is that a firm's IT can be effec- include organizational inefficiencies due to infonnation
tively taken over by external vendors when it is less "strate- processing (e.g., costs of communication, costs of miscom-
gic" or more "operational" in disposition (Hovey 1990). munication, and opportunity costs due to delays in commu-
Conceptually, such an argument is linked to the notion of nication) and lack of relevant information. In other words,
core competencies (Prahalad and Hamel 1990), These these costs are related to the acquisition and usage of
competencies refer to the collective learning of the corpora- information surrounding each corporate decision. Decision
tion and its capability to coordinate diverse production information costs increase higher up in the organizational
skills and to integrate multiple streams of technologies. It hierarchy. This is because of the need of top managers to
is only through such specialization in knowledge activities rely on the information generated by the lower subordinates
that firms can efficiently conserve on management costs. to make decisions.
The management of the IT infrastructure in the information In the specific context of IT governance, one key construct
era is a sophisticated activity. Companies are often dis- underlying decision information costs is related to the
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extent in which top management is involved in the strategic only direct technology costs but also indirect costs of
planning of the IT function. Traditionally, the locale of supporting the administration of the firm.
responsibility for IT strategy is vested with top management
or IT management or is being shared by both groups Hypothesis 12: The fiscal impetus to reduce IT
(Applegate and Elam 1992). The basic argument is that costs is positively related with firm costs that are
when top management is closely involved with the strategic associated with IT outsourcing.
management of the IT function, decision information costs
may arise. This is because information for effective IT Following our earlier case of dyadic costs, we synthesize
planning is derived from the managers and staff of the the above discussion for the various components of firm
functional domain (Keen 1988). When critical decisions costs. Specifically, we posit
are embodied with the top management, decision informa-
tion costs can arise. Hypothesis 13: Firm costs inherent in the IT
infrastructure are positively related with an out-
Hypothesis 11: Top management involvement in sourcing mode of IT governance.
the planning of the IT function is negatively re-
lated with firm costs that are associated with IT In line with our organizational economic decomposition of
outsourcing. governance costs, we contend that firm costs and dyadic
costs are both critical in the choice of an appropriate IT
governance option. Thus, we hypothesize in the null form:
2.3 Production/Procurement Costs
Hypothesis 14: Dyadic costs and firm costs are
The cost of any corporate resource depends on whether it is equally important in the context of IT outsourcing.
produced internally or procured externally. If it is being
acquired from an outside supplier, the cost would simply be
the market price paid. The emphasis in microeconomics 3. METHODS
has, however, been to analyze how firms generate the
resource outputs from more basic factor inputs. Here, firms 3.1 Research Design
face a fundamental problem of allocating scarce resources
among alternative uses. In this respect, the firm incurs Our population is the set of large firms in the U.S. busi-
production costs which are determined by the costs of the ness sector. Our sampling frame comprises the corpora-
separate factors involved. A factor can affect total produc- tions in the Fortune 500 categories. To generate a mailing
tion costs both directly as well as indirectly through its list for the survey, personalized letters were initially sent to
effects on the productivity of other factors. the chief executive officers (CEOs) of these corporations
with an invitation to participate in our study. We required
In the case of IT, the choice for an efficient governance is the chief information officers (CIOs) as well as the direc-
linked to IT being a separate input resource as well as a tors for three IT areas, namely application development,
critical determinant for other input resources in the firm's data center management, and telecommunications/network
production function. In other words, the sourcing decision management. The final result was a set of 226 companies
of a firm is fiscally motivated by cost considerations. First, that agreed to participate.
these fiscal benefits for sourcing are IT-based. Investments
in IT have recently escalated and account for about half of We sent the appropriate pretested questionnaires to the IT
the capital expenditure for most large firms (Keen 1991). managers in each of the participating companies. Table 1
Firms thus find it necessary to adopt a better cost control shows the statistics for the questionnaires returned. The
approach to managing IT (Strassmann 1990). Increasingly, three area questionnaires have an overall return rate of
corporations are rationalizing their capital outlay on IT. 79.4%. Out of the 226 participating corporations, 201 of
them had at least one respondent. The data are pooled
Second, fiscal benefits can be business-based. A firm's across the IT areas for the data analysis.
business cost structure (i.e., the entire spectrum of costs
directly associated with the actual production and coordina-
tion of the firm's product line) is a critical source of 3.2 Operationalization
business competence given its role in explaining business
profitability (Buzzell and Gale 1987). With the ubiquitous Earlier, we developed a set of key constructs for dyadic
nature of IT that pervades the entire process of trans- costs and firm costs in the particular context of IT gover-
forming input into output (Porter and Millar 1985), the nance (see Figure 1). We show the measures associated
costs associated with a particular IT governance include not with each of the constructs in the appendix.
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Table 1. Survey Returns Statistics
Questionnaires Questionnaires Returns
IT Area Mailed Returned Percentage
Application Development 197 158 80.2%
Data Center 193 159 82.4%
Telecommunciations/Network 196 148 75.5%
Overall 586 465 79.4%
3-3 Analytical Methodology and firm costs would be shown to have unequal impact on
ITgovernance.
Building an Operational Model for IT Governance. In
line with our specification of Hypotheses 1 to 14, we 4. RESULTS
construct an operational model with dyadic costs and firm
costs as second-order constructs. The individual compo- 4.1 Preliminary Statistics
nents of these costs constitute the first-order constructs
from which the second-order constructs draw their mean- We analyzed the data using a widely used statistical pack-
ingfulness. Methodologically, since the covariances of the age for structural equation modeling, namely, LISREL 7.
first-order constructs are explained in terms of the second- Since we have both continuous and ordinal measures, the
order constructs (i.e., the degree of freedom required in the matrix of polychoric, polyserial, and product moment
estimation is smaller), our model examines the covariation correlations was initially generated and subsequently used
of the key components of IT governance in a more parsi- in Lhe analysis. Any missing data were deleted pairwise.
monious manner (Marsh and Hocevar 1985). The rationale The final sample size used for the model estimation is 443.
for our operational model is rooted in a concept of fit as This satisfies various absolute minimum size criteria, for
covariation where a set of underlying dimensions is co- instance, 100 (Boomsma 1985) or 150 (Anderson and
aligned (Venkatraman 1989). Thus, we are basically Gerbing 1984). Further, it meets the relative size criterion
looking at the pattern consistency of IT governance with a of five times the number of parameters to be estimated
range of organizational economic lower-order constructs (Bender and Chou 1987). In our operational model, there
vis-a-vis dyadic costs and firm costs as higher-order con- are 84 free parameters implying that a minimum size of
structs. Using the earlier notations, Figure 2 depicts the 420 is required. Thus, using both the absolute and relative
operational model to be estimated where the notations criteria, the sample size is adequate.
follow those used by JOreskog and SOrbom (1989). It also
shows the expected signs for all the path coefficients in the
model. 4.2 Main Results
Testing Hypotheses 1 to 14. In general, the test of the Figure 3 shows the key results for the operational model
hypotheses involves the relevant path coefficients linking based on the maximum likelihood estimates. All the
Lhe various constructs. Specifically, Hypotheses 1 to 7 and estimated path coefficients (in the AY and r matrices) have
9 to 12 are tested by examining the directionalities and the expected signs, with the single exception of uncertainty.
significances of the y parameters linking the appropriate Further, they are statistically significant (p<.05), except for
first-order constructs (i.e., the constructs within the various the relationships between dyadic costs and both asset
cost domains) to the second-order constructs (i.e., dyadic specificity and uncertainty. In other words, we have
costs and firm costs). Similarly, Hypotheses 8 and 12 are obtained statistical support for Hypotheses 3 to 13, while
tested through the y parameters linking IT sourcing with evidence for Hypotheses 1 and 2 are inconclusive (see
dyadic costs and firm costs respectively. Hypothesis 14 is Table 2). In other words, the significances of the path
tested by comparing a nested constrained model where the coefficients linking the first-order constructs to the two
absolute values of the two y parameters are set to be equal second-order constructs establish the critical roles played by
with an unconstrained model (i.e., our operational model as the constructs underlying bargaining costs, agency costs,
shown in Figure 2). If the difference in %2 statistic is influence costs, management costs, decision information
significant, it means that the unconstrained model is costs, and production/procurement costs, although the
superior (Anderson and Gerbing 1988); thus, dyadic costs importance of transaction costs has not been indicated.
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Figure 2. The IT Governance Operational Model
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Table 2. Summary of Results for Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis Description Method of Testing Test Statistic Inference
Positive relationship between asset specificity Examine directionality
1 and dyadic costs in IT outsourcing and significance of Yi,1 t = 0.097 Not supported
Positive relationship between uncertainty and Examine directionality
2 dyadic costs in IT outsourcing and significance of 721 t= -1.137 Not supported
Negative relationship between goal alignment Examine directionality
3 and dyadic costs in IT outsourcing and significance of 73,1 t = -6.872*** Supported
Negative relationship between contractual Examine directionality
4 resolution and dyadic costs in IT outsourcing and significance of 74,1 t = -8.732*** Supported
Negative relationship between monitoring and Examine directionality
5 dyadic costs in IT outsourcing and significance of 75,1 t = 4.873*** Supported
Negative relationship between incentive payoff Examine directionality
6 and dyadic costs in IT outsourcing and significance of Y6,1 t = -6.043*** Supported
Positive relationship between agreement Examine directionality
5 7 inducement and dyadic costs in IT outsourcing and significance of 77,1 t = 2.763** Supported
Negative relationship between dyadic costs and Examine directionality
8 outsourcing mode of IT governance and significance of 712.1 t = -2.058* Supported
Negative relationship between strategic Examine directionality
9 disposition of IT and firm costs in IT outsourcing and significance of 78.2 t = -9.498*** Supported
Positive relationship between technological Examine directionality
10 imperative and firm costs in IT outsourcing and significance of 792 t = 2.665** Supported
Negative relationship between top management Examine directionality
11 involvement and firm costs in IT outsourcing and significance of 710.2 t= -11.214*** Supported
Positive relationship between fiscal impetus and Examine directionality
12 firm costs in IT outsourcing and significance of 711,2 t = 2.808** Supported
Positive relationship between firm costs and Examine directionality
13 outsourcing mode of IT governance and significance of 712 2 t = 3.820*** Supported
Equal impact of dyadic costs and firm costs on IT Compare the theoretical
14 outsourcing model with a constrained x2d (df:1) = 1.27 Supportedmodel where the absolute
values of 7121 and 712,2
are set to be equal
Note: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001
As for Hypothesis 14, we compare the difference in %2 indicator of composite reliability, Pe, as developed in
statistic for the unconstrained operational model and an Bagozzi (1981). All the values for p. exceed 0.5, signify-
appropriate constrained model with the path coefficients ing that the construct variances dominate the respective
linking both dyadic costs and firm costs to IT sourcing error variances. The attainment of this consistency estab-
specified to be equal. The value of this statistic L' (df: 1) lishes the homogeneity (i.e., both unidimensionality and
is 1.27, thus indicating that there is no significant difference reliability) of the measures associated with each construct.
between the two models. The interpretation is that both
dyadic costs and firm costs (which are individually signifi- Results on Validity. Convergent validity can be deter-
cant) are equally important in their impact on IT sourcing. mined by the statistical significances and directionalities of
This result is also consistent with our earlier dichotomy of the path coefficients pertaining to the individual measures
goveniance costs ilito these two cost categories. underlying the first-order constructs as well as those of
these first-order constructs associated with the second-order
constructs. Convergent validity is supported by the results
4.3 Supporting Results pertaining to the X and the 7 parameters as noted earlier. In
other words, we have demonstrated the agreement of the
Results on Model Fit. We evaluate the model fit of our measures or constructs underlying every construct.
operational model while recognizing the statistical problems
of large degree of freedom and sample size (Hayduk 1990; Discriminant validity for our operational model can beMarsh and Hocevar 1985). Hoelter (1983) derives a evaluated by comparing the %2 statistic of this model to that
critical-N (CN) statistic that stipulates the maximum sample
size up to which a particular model cannot be rejected
obtained under a nested constrained model in two ways as
under the null for the %2 test. Using a probability level of follows: (1) to test this validity of the first-order con-
0.05, the computed the CN statistic for our operational
structs, the path coefficients linking the first-order con-
structs to the second-order constructs are constrained tomodel is 239.26. This is above the proposed threshold
value of 200, lhus indicating an adequate model fit. An ad one; (2) to test this validity of the second-order construcls,
hoc but informative index is by dividing the %2 statistic the correlation of these two second-order constructs is
with the associated degrees of freedom to obtain the %2/df constrained to one. In sum, the examination of internal
ratio. This equals 2.33 in our model, which meets the consistency and validity also addresses the key components
cutoff ratio of 2 as a benchinark of acceptable fit (Carmines of a general notion of construct validity (Bagozzi 1980).
and McIver 1981).
In the case of assessing the validity of the first-order
The contemporary approach of addressing model adequacy constructs, %42 (df: 11) is 778.48 (p<.001). For the second-
is the use of relative fit indices that are based on a compar- order constructs, %42 (df: 1) is 58.39 (p<.001). The differ-
ison of hierarchical (or nested) models (Anderson and ence in %2 compared to the operational model is significant
Gerbing 1988). We consider two reasonably specified null under the two estimations, thus implying that each construct
models through a zero-value constraint placed on (1) the differs from one another for both the first- and second-
two y parameters linking the dyadic and firm costs con- order constructs.
structs to the IT sourcing construct and (2) all y parameters
as well as the correlation parameter between the dyadic and Results on Sample Pooling. To justify the use of a pooled
firm costs construct. In case (1), %d2 (df:2) is 25.60 sample of respondents in three IT areas as well as in both
(p<.001) while in case (2), %42 (df:4) is 300.10 (p<.001). service and industrial sectors, we performed a subgroup
For these alternative null models, the differences in &12 analysis through an appropriate splitting of the dataseL To
relative to the operational model are all statistically signifi- circumvent the problem of interpretational confounding
cant. In addition, we specify another alternative model (Burt 1976) in the analysis, we used a measurement model
where there are only two first-order constructs (dyadic costs based on two second-order constructs (i.e., dyadic costs and
and firm costs) affecting IT sourcing. This is estimated by firm costs) and the appropriate first-order constructs. First,
imposing a constraint of one on the path coefficients we compared the model fit for the case where the para-
linking the first-order constructs to the second-order con- meters set free to vary across the three groups (IT areas)
structs in the original operational model. Here, %42 (df:1) is wilb another model where ¢ and V are constrained to be58.39 (p<.001), which indicated a significant difference in invariant across the groups; this yielded %42 (df:4) is 3.92model fiL Overall, the fact that the full operational model (p>.05), which is not statistically significant. Second, we
performed better than two base models and an alternative
performed the same test using industry sectors as groups;model suggests that there is adequate model fit.
we have %42 (df:2) is 4.84 (p>.05). In summary, the sub-
Results on Reliability. Table 3 shows the results pertain- group analyses support the pooling of respondents by IT
ing to the evaluation of internal consistency using an
areas and by industry sectors.
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Strategic Disposition of IT 0.7110
Technological Imperative 0.8007
Top Management Involvement 0.9327
Fiscal Impetus 0.8666
IT Outsourcing 0.6231
5. DISCUSSION 1992). The implication is that it is possible to mitigate
dyadic nuances even while engaging in outsourcing rela-
Overall, our organizational-economic model for IT gover- tionships. Thus, even when dyadic costs are high, firms
nance is largely supported. Although the strength of our can still engage in market-oriented IT governance, provided
findings lie in the significances of path coefficients in the it is possible to implement adequate control mechanisms in
various dyadic and firm cost domains, the nonsignificance the contracts.
of the coefficients relating specifically to the transaction
costs constructs is an interesting discovery. An immediate In conclusion, the empirical results provide a preliminary
implication is that transaction costs are shadowed by the endorsement of our organizational economic model for IT
newer constructs of organizational economics. Indeed, the governance. They show that using dyadic and firm costs as
transaction costs approach has often been criticized for its second-order constructs can effectively demonstrate the
omission in considering other market and hierarchical costs significance of the path relationships. In particular, they
(e.g., Milgrom and Roberts 1990; Perrow 1981). Our provide empirical support for developing constructs for the
model results represent an initial effort toward resolving determination of IT governance using the emerging do-
this critical issue. mains of organizational economics; namely bargaining
costs, agency costs, influence costs, managemeiit costs, and
In our results, all the path coefficients have the expected decision information costs.
direction of change except in the case of uncertainty.
Traditionally, the relationship of uncertainty with transac-
tion costs or, more generally, with dyadic costs has been 6. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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Asset Specificity (Measures yl to y4):
Please indicate the degree of uniqueness (or similarity) of your specific IT area in relation to other firms within your
industry.
Similar to othersUnique to
our firm in our industry
Overall architecture 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Operating procedures 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
IT knowledge/experience base 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
IT staff training 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(Measures yl to 94 were reverse scaled for the analysis.)
Uncertainty (Measures y5 to y'7):
How do you rate the level of uncertainty for the following within your specific IT area?
Low level of High level of
uncertainty uncertainty
Obsolescence of current hardware/software 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Cost-performance trends 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Quality of final ou*uts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Goal Alignment (Measures y8 to y10):
A healthy relationship with an IT vendor depends critically on the compatibility of goals in both contracting parties. To
what extent would you feel that the following are potential problems in a contractual relationship with a vendor?
Not a potential A potential
problem problem
Subordinating self-interest to joint interest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Having a bilateral understanding of roles and 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
responsibilities
Cultivating a shared vision 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(Measures y8 to ylO were reverse scaled for the analysis.)
Contractual Resolution (Measures yll to y13):
Whether you are engaged in insourcing or outsourcing, the ease of negotiation toward a mutually agreeable arrangement is
a critical issue in the choice of a sourcing strategy. How easy or difficult would you think it is to resolve the following
issues during the contract negotiation process with an IT vendor?
Easy to resolve Difficult to resolve
with a vendor with a vendor
Staff employment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Dispute settlement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Renewalennination option 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(Measures yll to y13 were reverse scaled for the analysis.)
Monitoring (Measures y14 to y16):
After the contract is signed with an IT vendor, it is necessary and important to oversee the efforts of the vendor. How easy
or difficult would you think it is to monitor the vendor wilh respect to the following?
Easy to monitor Difficult to monitor
Operadng performance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Investnents for technological innovation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Inveshnents in staff development 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(Measures y 14 to y 16 were reverse scaled for the analysis.)
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Incentive Payoff (Measures y17 to y19):
The implementation of a pricing mechanism is an important issue in a contract with an IT vendor. There is a large variety
of mechanisms such as "fixed-price," "cost-plus," and "pay-per-service." How easy or difficult would you think it is to
structure the contract using the following?
Easy to structure Difficult to structure
A payment system based on actual level 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
of requirements and services provided
Penalties or damages in the events of 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
specific contingencies
An incen ve bonus based on our actual 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
overall business perfo,mance
(Measures 717 to y19 were reverse scaled for the analysis.)
Agreement Inducement (Measures y20 to y22):
Your business is valuable to the IT vendor community. In general, vendors have a variety of ways, some of which are
counter-productive, to approach potential customers like yourself. How frequent (or infrequenO would you view tile
following as being used by IT vendors to secure an outsourcing contract in a counter-productive sense?
Infrequent Frequent
Intensive sales promotion efforts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Emphasis on cultivating personal relationships 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Attempts to lock-in customers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strategic Disposition of IT (Measures y23 to y26):
Companies have different ways of positioning IT in the context of their overall businesses. How would you perceive your
specilic /T area in relation to your.finn? Please check the appropriate box on the bipolar scale provided.
Pedpheral to the core Central to the core
business of our firm 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I business of our fimi
Relates to operational Relates to strategic
aspects of our business I l lilli l. aspects of our business
Entails competencies easy to Entails competencies dimcult to
be imitated by competitors lilli Ill be imitated by competitors
Contributes to perceived Does not contlibute to perceived
benefits of our final customers 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 benefits of our final customers
(To maintain consistency in the directionality of all measures in this construct, y26 was reverse coded.)
Technological Imperative (Measures y27 to y30):
How relevant (or irrelevant) are the following ben<jits of outsourcing for your firm?
Irrelevant Relevant
Access to critical computer technologies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Access to technical expertise 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Promoting innovation in IT usage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Reduction of IT staN shortages 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Top Management Involvement (Measures y31 to y34):
Top management of companies have different philosophies pertaining to the appropriate role of IT in relation to the overall
business. How would you perceive the attitude of top management of your firm toward IT in the context of your specific IT
area?
AlwaysSeldom
Incorporating IT as an integral part of our firm's 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
mission or goals
Having a clear alticulation of the IT planning process 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Contributing actively to the IT planning process 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Considering IT as a strategic investment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Fiscal Impetus (Measures y35 to y38):
How relevant (or irrelevant) are the following benefits of outsourcing for your firm?
Irrelevant Relevant
Increase in business perionnance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Increase in IT productivity 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Savings in IT expenditures 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Savings in operating the entire business 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
IT Outsourcing (Measures y39 to y41):
Please indicate how the decision rights or responsibilities pertaining to your specific IT area are distributed for the
following processes.
Fully vested Jointly Fully vested with
within our firm Determined an IT vendor
Overall architecture 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Specific platform 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Procurement of hardware/software 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Management of personnel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Quality control 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Installation/integration 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Operating and monitoring 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Maintenance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Upgrading and migrating 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Cost control 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
(Measure y39 is computed as the sum of 3 components of outsourcing, techi,ological resource, human resource, and technical procedures.
Technological resource coinponent is calculated as the average of the first three items above, human resource component is the fourth item above,
while technical procedures coinponent is tlie average of the last six items above.)
How do you rate the overall degree of outsourcing in your specific IT area?
Low relative to other Same High relative to other
firms in our industry firms in our industry
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
How has the outsourcing of IT requirements changed in your specific IT area?
Decreased over No change Increased over
last 3 years last 3 years
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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